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A significant and influential body of research suggests that 
electoral systems influence legislators’ behavior. Yet, empirical 
research frequently fails to uncover the existence of such a 
relationship. This study offers a potential solution: The core 
suggestion is that the mechanisms by which prized post-election 
positions (mega-seats) are distributed within a legislature impacts 
legislative behavior. When party leaders cartelize the allocation of 
mega-seats, the anticipated effects of the electoral system on 
legislators’ behavior may dissolve. Ireland’s candidate-centered 
electoral system and party-controlled mega-seat allocation provides 
for a hard empirical test of the argument. New data on mega-seats 
and voting behavior in the Irish parliament between 1980 and 
2010 supports the notion that mega-seat considerations rather than 
the electoral system shapes roll-call behavior. The implication is 
that what goes on within the legislature may be more important for 
influencing legislators’ behavior than what goes on at the ballot 
box. This observation may resolve the puzzle of why electoral 
systems do not always exert their purported influence.  
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At least since Mayhew’s (1974) discovery of an “electoral connection” and Fenno’s 
(1978) study of House members’ “home style,” conventional wisdom suggests that 
the electoral system shapes legislators’ behavior. Arguably, candidate-centered 
elections promote centrifugal legislatures (such as the U.S. Congress) characterized 
by relatively weak levels of party voting unity (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997), congruence between constituency preferences and 
representative behavior (Miller and Stokes, 1963), and a strong committee system 
privileging individual members over political parties (Katz and Sala 1996; Shepsle 
and Weingast 1987, but see further Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). In contrast, as 
Katz (1980) argued, party-centered electoral systems expectedly produce strong-party 
legislatures making party labels the defining explanation of individual legislative 
behavior in many legislatures (Carey 2007, 2009). In short, whether or not 
incumbents need to cultivate a personal-vote or a party-vote defines incumbents’ 
interests and behavior (Carey and Shugart 1995). 
This study questions the centrality of the influence of electoral systems in 
shaping legislators’ behavior. Contrary to conventional perspectives focusing on 
electoral origins of actions, it is suggested that what legislators must do to secure 
prized post-election positions matters. Using a term introduced by Carroll, Cox, and 
Pachón (2006), allocation of “mega-seats,” should be considered in explaining 
legislative behavior. Valuable “mega-seats” motivate behavior, and the variation in 
value and allocation mechanisms can explain behavior and ultimately even sever the 
link between electoral incentives and the behavior of legislators. Mega-seat allocation 
can occur under different rules, ranging from seniority and secret floor votes to 
systems in which party leaders, as a cartel, determine which legislator receives which 
assignments.  Ignoring mega-seats and the mechanisms by which they are allocated 
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may explain the confusing and contradictory empirical research exploring the 
consequences of electoral systems.i 
This study’s empirical focus is Ireland, whose political system provides a 
significant opportunity to test the degree to which mega-seats matter. Ireland’s Single 
Transferrable Vote (STV) electoral system is strongly candidate-centered, but control 
of mega-seats rests with party leaders within the legislature. As the research 
demonstrates by exploring all cases of indiscipline in the lower chamber of the Irish 
Parliament (Dáil) between 1980 and 2010, rebellions are extremely rare with only 15 
breaches of unified party voting in a 30-year period. To anticipate, the case study 
provides strong evidence that incentives to cultivate mega-seats shapes legislative 
behavior, resulting in a strong-party legislature emerging from a candidate-centered 
electoral environment. 
The significance of the argument and empirical findings extend well beyond 
the Irish example. Despite Strøm’s (1997) suggestion that a number of goals motivate 
parliamentarians in parliamentary systems, prominence in the academic literature 
remains with the re-election incentive as the motivational basis of observed behavior. 
Part of the significance of this research is the suggestion that winning post-election 
offices strongly motivates legislators, with consequences for observed behavior. This 
argument has potentially boarder consequences for the study of political institutions 
and the impact of electoral rules. Scholars have used variations among electoral 
systems to explain significant policy outcomes, from economic growth to balanced 
budgets (see, for example, Persson and Tabelini. 2003). Such research, arguably, may 
be overstating the impact and significance of electoral institutions by ignoring the 
political consequences of activities within the legislature. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: A review of the literature 
links electoral rules to legislators’ behavior is followed by a discussion of variations 
in the mechanisms to allocate mega-seats and the impact on the behavior of 
legislators. The Irish case is then introduced, providing evidence for the candidate-
centered nature of elections but the strong-party nature of the legislature and the 
proposal that mega-seats trump the electoral system. Matching analysis confirms the 
strategic allocation of Irish mega-seats to induce loyal partisanship and discourage 
party rebellions. The concluding section discusses the need to understand better 
incentivizing mechanisms within the legislature itself. 
 
Literature Review 
Research seeking to explain the behavior of Members of the United States Congress 
suggest an electoral connection. The candidate-centric nature of American elections 
compels Members of Congress to dedicate appropriate attention and resources to the 
priorities of their district’s constituents (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). Members 
behave in the legislative arena not as agents of their parties but as representatives of 
the preferences of their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963). Partisan loyalty in roll-
call behavior can adversely affect legislators’ electoral fortunes (Canes-Wrone et al. 
2002; Carson, Koger, Lebo, and Young 2010). Indeed, the goal of re-election, has 
implications beyond the behavior of individual members of Congress, perhaps even 
determining the internal organizational design of Congress itself (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988).  
Variations in election processes should provide an opportunity to test, 
comparatively, the electoral connection. One of the first to study the impact of 
electoral rules on legislator behavior is Katz (1980) who theorized a link between the 
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ballot structure and the degree of legislative voting according to party suggested that 
“where intraparty choice is allowed, parliamentary parties will tend to be disunited” 
(Katz 1980: 34). When voters choose between candidates from the same political 
party, candidates must differentiate themselves from their colleagues. One way to 
move beyond the party label is to act independent of the party in the legislative arena. 
Legislators must be sensitive to constituencies’ demands and work to build an 
independent electoral base. Empirically, Katz (1980) found only limited evidence that 
electoral systems impacted the level of party voting unity in the chamber.  
Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) suggested that the degree to which 
incumbents must cultivate a personal vote to be re-elected matters, and they 
contrasted the behavior of Members of the US Congress with the roles of Members of 
the British House of Commons (MPs). British MPs, operating in a party centered 
electoral environment, are much more likely than their US counterparts to vote strictly 
along party lines in the legislative arena. Indeed, Cox’s (1987) path-breaking study 
related the evolution of strong parties in the British House of Commons to the 
emerging significance of the electoral value of a strong party label for MPs. 
In classifying electoral systems based on the degree to which they create 
incentives for incumbents to cultivate personal votes, Carey and Shugart (1995) 
suggested that the personal versus party nature of the electoral system should have 
consequences. This renewed interest in the consequences of candidate-centered versus 
party-centered electoral systems motivates empirical tests of the effects of different 
electoral systems on legislator behavior. For example, with an empirical focus on 
Latin America, Carey (2007, 2009) tested the impact of competing principals on 
legislative voting unity and discovered evidence of an electoral connection. 
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Comparative research focusing on Western European countries has reached 
largely different conclusions. Contrary to expectations, Sieberer (2006) found that 
party voting unity is marginally stronger in candidate-centered than party-centered 
environments. Using roll call data from 16 countries, Depauw and Martin (2009) 
determined that election rules only partly explain party voting in European 
legislatures. As Owens (2003), observed, eliminating the impact of national covariates 
when attempting to uncover and isolate the impact of electoral systems on legislative 
behavior in different national and institutional environments is difficult.  
Legislatures elected using a mix of ballot structures permits further 
investigation of the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ behavior by effectively 
reducing the confounding effects of cross-nationally sensitive variables. Counter 
intuitively, Becher and Sieberer (2008) discovered that party-listed legislators in 
Germany are more likely to defect from the party leadership than their district-elected 
counterparts. However, considering the 16th German Bundestag (2005–2009), 
Sieberer (2010) found evidence that the electoral system matters for party discipline, 
although he concluded that higher levels of indiscipline among plurality MPs is not an 
attempt to satisfy local constituencies’ demands. The presence of dual candidacy in 
Germany (candidates on both the party-list and in single-member districts) creates 
difficulty in testing for a relationship between the methods of election and subsequent 
behavior (Zittel and Gschwend 2008). 
Haspel, Remington, and Smith (1998) determined that the level of voting unity 
within parties in the Russian Duma relates to whether or not a Deputy’s election is by  
single-member plurality or party-list. Thames (2005), however, asserted that the 
Russian Duma is an exception. Party discipline is, he claimed, shaped by the electoral 
system in the Russian Duma, but not in the other two mixed-mandate legislatures he 
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explored (the Hungarian National Assembly and the Ukrainian Rada).  Herron (2002) 
further investigated the latter and found that dual candidacy and the “safety” of the 
Deputy’s district or listed position impacts discipline. Research by Jun and Hix (2010) 
suggested that members of the Korean National Assembly, elected in single- member 
districts are less likely to vote in opposition to their party’s leadership than their 
counterparts elected on PR lists.  
The European Parliament, composed of MEPs elected under nationally 
determined electoral rules, provides another laboratory for the study of an electoral 
system’s impacts on legislative behavior. Bowler and Farrell (1993) found that 
electoral systems influence MEPs’ constituency service behavior, and Farrell and 
Scully (2007) confirmed that electoral systems’ variations impact MEPs’ 
considerations for and undertaking of their representative roles (see also, Farrell and 
Scully 2010). Scully and Farrell (2007) noted a shift in the behavior of British MEPs 
following the move from single-member districts to proportional representative ballot 
structures for electing British MEPs. Considering roll-call voting in the European 
Parliament, Hix (2004) determined that politicians elected under plurality rules are 
less responsive to their national party’s delegations than members elected in single 
districts (see also, Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). 
Studies of individual countries are somewhat less conclusive regarding the 
impact of electoral environments on legislators’ behavior. For example, in Estonia, 
according to Tavits (2010), having local roots renders MPs less likely to break from 
party unity compared to MPs with weaker local roots. For the Netherlands, Andeweg 
and Thomassen (2011) determined that campaigning for personal votes does not 
affect an MP’s party loyalty, reaffirming Heidar’s (2006) conclusion that the electoral 
system coincides little with levels of voting unity in the Dutch parliament. 
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The literature is, therefore, inconclusive: Many scholars theorize an electoral 
connection, expecting the ballot structure to shape legislators’ behavior. In contrast, 
empirical studies find only a weak electoral connection, no electoral connection, or a 
connection in opposition to theoretical prediction. The next section suggests the need 
to consider influences beyond the electoral system for explaining the strength of 
parties in legislative roll-call voting. 
 
The Impact of Mega-Seats on Legislators’ Behavior 
In a significant contribution, Carroll, Cox and Pachón (2006) suggested that 
democracy represents a series of choices for offices, beginning with legislative 
elections but continuing thereafter with the allocation of so-called “mega-seats” 
among legislators. Such positions of power reflect, in part, the need to control access 
to the plenary session and the need to avoid legislative bottlenecks (Cox 2006).  
Virtually all parliaments endow certain members with extra authority and 
responsibilities. The post of Prime Minister (PM) is likely one of the most sought-
after positions in a parliamentary system, followed closely by other seats in the 
cabinet. The post of presiding officer (or, as in many parliaments, membership of the 
presidium) is highly cherished for its status and practical benefits to the officeholder 
(Jenny and Müller 1995). The significance of committees may vary considerably 
among parliaments, but Committee Chairs in strong-committee legislatures can be 
extraordinarily powerful in terms of legislative process, executive oversight, and 
particularistic politics. Carroll, Cox and Pachón (2006) focused on the allocation of 
such seats among parties, suggesting that the allocation of seats forms “Chapter Two” 
in the democratic electoral cycle.  
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Scholars have long considered the impact of “Chapter 1” of electoral 
democracy on legislators’ behavior (the electoral connection literature discussed 
earlier) but researchers have been largely silent on the impact of “Chapter 2” (the 
allocation of mega-seats among legislators) on the behavior of legislators. The core 
contribution of the current research is to suggest that mega-seat availability and the 
mechanisms for their allocation influences legislative behavior - in particular the level 
of unified party voting arising from party discipline. 
Allocation of mega-seats occurs by a variety of means: A strictly non-partisan 
election involving all legislators as independent voters can occur, either by secret vote 
or open roll-call. Election of the Speaker of the British House of Commons occurs 
without involvement of the party leaders. The selection of Speaker is an issue for the 
House as a whole. Controversy arose with the selection of Selwyn Lloyd as Speaker 
in 1971 because Lloyd had received assurances of support from both the government 
and opposition leadership (Lloyd 1976). The irate response of ordinary MPs ensured a 
strengthening of the norm that ordinary MPs rather than party leaders select the 
Speaker.  
The United States Congress presents a clear example of mega-seat allocation 
under rules of seniority. The length of time served as a Member of the House or 
Senate, or more technically the continuous period of tenure in office, impacts greatly 
committee assignments. To facilitate appointment by seniority, the Clerk of the House 
of Representative maintains a seniority list. Since the downfall of Speaker Joseph 
Cannon in 2011, seniority has become the norm – with brief exceptions, most notably 
when Speaker Newt Gingrich attempted to regain control of committee chair 
appointments. Today, allocation of committee chairs continues according to the 
longest serving member of the committee from the ma
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Wahlbeck 2006, Cann 2008). The important point to note is that, with few violations, 
party leaders have little control over mega-seat allocation in the US Congress.  
In contrast to the above mechanisms, significantly more examples of mega-
seat allocation by the leadership of the legislative party exist. However, machinations 
of the operations and functions of parties within the legislative arenas remain 
relatively obscure, reflecting, perhaps, the often secretive and closed-door nature of 
those organizational units. Yet, legislative parties are clearly central to understanding 
the operation of modern parliaments and legislatures, even if operations of parties 
remain mysterious. Importantly, the leadership of the legislative party (defined as 
either the leader of the legislative party or some form of leadership committee) often 
retains formal or effective allocation rights over mega-seats. In parliamentary 
systems, the prime minister is usually the leader of the political party, and typically 
enjoys formal control over the allocation of other mega-seats, such as ministerial 
positions. Likewise, even when a chamber formally appoints individuals to mega-
seats, the party leader may retain sufficient effective control to ensure control over 
appointments to relevant positions. 
The core contribution of the current research is to suggest that the impact of 
mega-seats’ appointments mirrors in significance the impact of electoral system on 
legislators’ behavior. Party leader-centered allocation of mega-seats induces loyalty to 
the party leadership (as with party-centered electoral systems). In contrast, if the party 
leadership has no control over re-election (a candidate centered electoral system) or 
over the allocation of mega-seats (a seniority-based system) individual legislators are 
free to act within the legislative arena without the need to act in accordance with the 
preferences of their party leaders. Figure 1 presents the likely consequences of this for 
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one of the most observed and researched aspects of legislator behavior – the degree to 
which legislators from the same party vote the same way.   
<Figure 1 around here> 
Two of the four typologies provide clean-cut predictions for the level of 
unified party voting: Mega-seats filled through seniority, or those more generally free 
of the involvement of party leaders, combined with a candidate-centered electoral 
system should result in a decentralized legislature with the party leadership incapable 
of enforcing party discipline. Party voting unity should only occur when parties are 
ideologically cohesive – otherwise individual members will roll-call on the basis of 
their own preferences or the preferences of their constituents, with little regard for the 
wishes of the party leadership. The leadership can neither give nor remove much that 
the individual legislator values. Empirically, the U.S. Congress, perhaps, approaches 
most closely a reflection of this situation – the party leadership has little control over 
selection, election, and mega-seat allocation. The result is relatively low levels of 
observed unified party voting.  
When the party controls both the electoral fortunes of the incumbent and the 
allocation of mega-seats which the incumbents seeks to hold, a legislator risks serious 
career damage by contravening the party’s leadership. The prediction then is that 
unified party voting should be relatively high in such cases. Empirically, Norway 
would appear to fit this category – a party-list electoral system with assignments 
controlled by the party leadership (for example, individual legislators rank-order their 
preference for committee assignments in the Norwegian Storting and the party leaders 
then selects a committee’s membership), and relatively high levels of party voting 
unity. 
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Legislators may have complementary or competing principals in each stage of 
electoral democracy (seat and mega-seat). Here, each legislator must maximize their 
potentials for holding each type of seat, given their behavior. Voters in a candidate-
centered electoral environment may punish their legislators for voting along party 
lines (as noted in the literature review) but party loyalty may be essential to retain a 
mega-seat and/or guarantee access to mega-seats in the future. The case study of 
Ireland in the next section provides empirical evidence for this typology: a candidate-
centered electoral environment with a mega-seat allocation controlled exclusively by 
the party leadership.ii Finally, the European Parliament provides an example of a 
legislature elected primarily under party-centered electoral rules, but in which the 
party leadership does not control allocation of mega-seats.  
To understand why mega-seats influence behavior, appreciation of the degree 
of significance which legislators attach to such positions is necessary. Four 
advantages accrue to occupying mega-seats, as evident in most national legislatures: 
1. If a politician’s motivation for entering a political career is a desire to change 
and enhance public policy, doing so as an ordinary legislator (that is to say, a 
legislator not holding a mega-seat) poses difficulty. Instead, mega-seats 
provide a critical avenue and means to influence policy. For example, under 
parliamentarism, Cabinet Ministers wield significant influence over public 
policy making and implementation. Under presidentialism, the chairs of 
legislative committees may be significant in shaping, vetoing, and monitoring 
policy.  
2. Beyond policy, mega-seats are inherently prestigious and a hierarchy of 
sought-after political offices exists in most political systems. For example, the 
Speaker of the US House of Representatives is third in Presidential succession 
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according to the US Constitution. The Speaker of the British House of 
Commons is the “first commoner,” outranking in protocol even the Prime 
Minister. 
3. Mega-seats can be financially lucrative, carrying valuable additional salary, 
enhanced pensions, extra resources, and entitlements, including private office 
staffed by publicly-funded staff, living accommodations, and chauffeur 
service. 
4. Mega-seats can assist re-election. In candidate-centered electoral systems, 
mega-seats, such as committee chairs, can provide distributional electoral 
advantage (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). In party-centered electoral systems, 
performing well in a mega-seat adds to a legislator’s visibility within the 
legislative party, and, assuming competency, further enhances credibility with 
party leadership. 
Although widely underestimated as a source of behavior, some scholarship has 
implied importance for legislative office for influencing legislators’ behavior: Strøm 
(1997) provides a theoretical neo-institutional framework, which includes party office 
and legislative office as determinants of legislators’ roles. Similarly, much of earlier 
descriptive literature on the causes of voting unity identified “carrots and sticks” as 
potential tools to compel unified party voting (for a recent review, see Kam 2009). 
More recent empirical study of roll-call behavior found that executive office and 
parliamentary party explain patterns of defection in the Germany parliament (Becher 
and Sieberer 2008). Benedetto and Hix (2007) found that government rebels in the 
2001-2005 British House of Commons were mainly those rejected for, or ejected 
from, ministerial offices. Jun and Hix (2010) reached similar conclusions for the 
National Assembly of South Korea. Considering 16 countries, Depauw and Martin 
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(2009) determined that the level of observed party unity relates to opportunities for 
ministerial promotion (measured as the proportion of the legislature that obtain a 
ministerial office) when ministerial autonomy is strong.  
Exploring the actual behavior of legislators elected under a candidate-centered 
electoral environment but with mega-seat allocation controlled by party leaders 
provides a hard empirical test of whether or not mega-seats matter. As discussed next, 
the Irish case provides such an opportunity.  
 
Ireland’s Candidate-Centered Elections 
Seven elements of Ireland’s electoral environment and incumbent behavior suggest 
that incumbents must cultivate a personal vote rather than party vote to gain re-
election: 
1. Under STV, voters formally vote for individual candidates. Electors rank-
order candidates, giving a first preference vote to their most favored candidate, 
a second preference vote to their second preferred candidate, etc…, until 
reaching indifference toward the remaining candidates. District magnitude 
varies between 3 (17 constituencies), 4 (15 constituencies) and 5 (11 
constituencies). To help voters identify candidates, photographs of each 
candidate accompany their names on the ballot (Buckley, Collins, and Reidy 
2007).  
2. In terms of voting behavior, evidence suggests that that the Irish electorate 
votes for individual candidates rather than on the basis of party identification. 
Asked to explain their voting choices, 45 percent of survey respondents 
indicated that candidates’ personal attributes were the reason for voting for 
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that candidate; whereas, only 10 percent of respondents indicated that party 
label influenced their choices (Marsh 2007). 
3. Candidates and incumbents from the same party compete against each other 
for electoral success. Between 1922 and 1997, 34 percent of defeated 
incumbents lost their seats to a candidate from the same party (Gallagher 
2000: 97). With the main competition for seats coming from candidates within 
the same party (Sinnott 2005: 121), campaigning at constituency-level often 
concentrates on securing votes otherwise destined for a co-partisan candidate 
rather than competing with candidates from other parties. 
4. Non-party candidates (independents) are an important feature of the Irish 
political landscape. For example in the March 2011 General Election, of the 
165 TDs elected, 14 were affiliated with no political party. As Weeks (2011) 
argued, such independent politicians are a persistent and significant feature 
because of their ability to respond to certain features of Irish political culture, 
particularly localism (preference of voters to vote for a candidate from their 
immediate neighborhood) and personalism (preference of voters to vote for 
candidates known personally to them). The emergence and success of non-
party candidates reflects the candidate-centered nature of Irish elections. 
5. STV permits an analysis of transfer patterns, from higher preferences to lower 
preferences upon elimination of candidates or the transfer of surpluses votes. 
For the two largest parties, estimates indicate that 40 percent of voters 
assigned their first and second preferences to candidates from different parties 
in the 2002 election (Gallagher 2003: 106). 
6. The loss of a party label, for whatever reason, does not lead to the loss of the 
seat at the subsequent general election. To the contrary, incumbents who lose 
 15 
the party label often increase their popular vote at the subsequent general 
election. For example, amid allegations of impropriety, Michael Lowry’s 
forced resignation as a Cabinet Minister in 1996 and his Fine Gael party’s 
removing him from the party ticket resulted in him standing as an independent 
candidate. His share of the vote increased to 29 percent from 23 percent in the 
previous election.  
7. Further evidence of the importance of personal votes under STV arises from 
the observation that Dáil deputies spend a significant proportion of their time 
focused on constituency matters. Wood and Young (1997) identified that Irish 
legislators dedicate almost 60 percent of their time to constituency affairs and 
spend 2.5 days per week in the constituency. Martin (2010) found that the 
proportion of the working week spent attending to constituency-related 
activities was just over 60 percent.  
In summary, incumbents seeking re-election face a candidate-centered electoral 
environment. Before providing evidence of roll-call behavior of Irish legislators, the 
next section reviews the availability of mega-seats in the Dáil and, crucially, the 
nature of the role party leaders play in allocating mega-seats.   
 
Ireland’s Party-Controlled Mega-Seats 
Table 1 provides details of the most significant mega-seats available to Irish 
parliamentarians. The table shows mega-seats, number of available positions, and the 
immediate financial rewards additional to Dáil Deputies basic parliamentary salaries. 
Perhaps most striking is the number of mega-seats available. For a legislature with 
166 members, this research calculates that 128 mega-seats affording legislators 
enhanced salaries from public funds are available. When excluding membership of the 
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opposition frontbench (which tend to be funded by the parties themselves), a mega-
seat is effectively available to any Dáil Deputy belonging to a political party.iii 
Beyond the monetary value and prestige, mega-seats confer a whole series of benefits: 
For example, the Ceann Comhairle (presiding officer of the Dáil) receives a 
remuneration and expenses package equal to that of a Cabinet Minister. An added 
benefit is that the Ceann Comhairle, at the time of dissolution prior to a general 
election, gains  automatic re-election to the Dáil. Clearly, a hierarchy of mega-seats 
exists and in practice, lower-level mega-seats tend to be a necessary condition for 
promotion to more significant and valuable mega-seats. Thus, not only can most 
parliamentarians expect a mega-seat, but also the possibility exists for advancement to 
an even more rewarding and significant mega-seats in the future. 
<Table 1 around here> 
In Ireland, allocation of mega-seats occurs, formally, according to two 
different mechanisms for appointing office holders and is dependent on the specific 
office. An open vote of the chamber fills positions such as that of the Taoiseach and 
Ceann Comhairle, but in reality, party leaders determine nominations for their co-
partisans. This access-control renders any floor vote a mere formality. Thus, unlike 
the election of the Speaker of the British House of Commons, election of the 
presiding office of the Dáil is by a partisan vote with party leaders determining the 
nominees.  
 The Taoiseach nominates cabinet ministers, and during periods of single party 
government, the Taoiseach (who is also the party leader), has complete authority over 
the nomination and dismissal of individual cabinet ministers. During periods of 
coalition government, the situation becomes slightly more complicated. Formally, the 
Taoiseach has authority to nominate individual legislators to cabinet positions, but in 
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reality having allocated portfolios to each party, each party leader selects which party 
member assumes a particular mega-seat (O’Malley 2006). Ultimately, of course, what 
is important  is that the party leader always controls access to high office. 
 In the case of committee assignments and committee chairs, a committee of 
the party’s whips determines assignments. Party whips are responsible for ensuring 
discipline and good behavior among their parliamentary party’s members, and  
interestingly the whips play a key role in determining which legislators receive which 
mega-seat assignments. The party whip, itself a mega-seat, is the result of direct 
selection by the party leader. Clearly then, party leaders or their immediate agent, in 
the form of the party whip, maintain a cartel-like grip on the appointment of members 
of their legislative party to mega-seats.  
Evidence suggests that party leaders have effective control over removing 
members from mega-seats, for example, the Taoiseach can re-shuffle the cabinet. It is 
also standard practice for members who are removed from the parliamentary party to 
also resign from, or alternatively face a motion to remove them from, mega-seats. For 
example, in 2001, upon expulsion from the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party, Deputy 
Liam Lawlor immediately faced calls to resign as vice-chairman of a parliamentary 
committee. He resigned ahead of a vote for removal (The Irish Times January 12, 
2001). Thus, both the allocation to, and continuation in, a mega-seat are subject to the 
dominion and preferences of the party leader.  
The next section discusses the competing impacts of a candidate-centered 
electoral system and party-controlled mega-seat allocations on the roll-call behavior 
of Irish legislators. 
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Mega-Seats’ Influence on Inducing Party Discipline 
Floor votes garner greater scrutiny than other parliamentary behavior for at least three 
reasons: First, and very practically, votes tend to be recorded and available, making 
them a rich and accessible data source for legislative scholars. Second, each 
individual legislator has the right to vote in plenary. As Cox (2006) suggested, this is 
an unusual occasion where all members of the legislature are formally equal in power 
and significance, and all legislators’ roll-call votes are observable. Third, in many 
countries, finding variations in roll-call behavior is common, providing the 
opportunity to hypothesize and test for causal relations. 
A common assumption is that the level of voting unity in Irish parliamentary 
parties is exceptionally high. Indeed, undertaking a roll-call analysis of voting 
provides results so close to 100 per cent that some might question the reason for doing 
so, mirroring Beer’s (1969:350-351) comment that party voting in the British House 
of Commons “was so close to 100 per cent that their was no longer any point in 
measuring it.”  
This study, following (Gallagher 2010), takes a slightly different approach by 
isolating breaches of voting unity in Irish parliamentary parties. Table 2 reports 
details of all cases of voting unity breaches between 1980 and 2010 involving a 
member who either voted against the party’s position or abstained from a vote without 
the party’s permission (deliberate abstention). To identify breaches of party discipline 
The Irish Times daily coverage of parliamentary proceedings was reviewed. The same 
media coverage of votes involving abstentions is the source for determining whether 
or not abstentions were in agreement with the party leadership, were the result of an 
error (either on the part of the individual member or the party whip), or were 
deliberate actions of indiscipline. Of the large number of votes taken annually in the 
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Dáil, virtually none recorded members’ deliberately abstaining or voting against their 
parties’ position. An abstention or contravening vote against the party’s leadership 
makes front-page headlines.iv 
<Table 2 around here> 
Between 1980 and the end of 2010, only on 8 occasions did an individual 
member cast a vote contrary to the party, and only on 7 occasions did a member 
deliberately abstain in a floor vote. By any comparative standard, the level of 
parliamentary party unity is extraordinarily high, as confirmed by earlier comparative 
studies, which include Ireland (Depauw and Martin, 2009). Interestingly, only one 
deputy (Deputy Broughan, Labour Party) breached party discipline on more than one 
occasion– in his case, he did so three times. The remaining 12 Dáil Deputies breached 
party voting guidelines only once in the 30 years period under review.  
To confirm that discipline drives roll-call behavior requires addressing the 
issue of party cohesion as a source of voting unity. Members of the same party may 
vote the same way because they have ideologically similar preferences, which 
differentiates them from members of a different party. In contrast, party discipline 
occurs when a parliamentarian would prefer to vote against the party position on a 
given vote, but nevertheless, chooses to vote in accord with the party’s leadership. 
Part of the challenge for roll-call scholars and in particular scholars of parties in the 
legislative arena is to differentiate discipline-induced behavior from “natural” levels 
of underlying cohesion. This undertaking is not easily accomplished, absent 
independent measures of members’ ideological preferences. As explained next, 
discounting ideological cohesiveness of Irish parties as the cause of voting unity is 
possible. 
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By conventional agreement, the Irish party system appears to be unusual in the 
European context, because it lacks party families with well-structured policy 
differences (Mair 1987). Often disentangling policy preferences of the two major 
political parties as presented to the electorate is impossible (Weeks 2009), leading to 
characterization of political parties in Ireland as broad churches, even in the 
parliamentary arena (Hansen 2009). At the party level, the amount of variance in 
positioning Irish political parties on a left-right ideological continuum (Benoit and 
Laver 2005), indirectly confirms the broad church hypothesis – both voters and 
experts have difficulty locating parties’ ideologies, in part because Irish political 
parties consist of elected officials with differing ideologies. The Laver and Benoit 
(2002) analysis of speeches in the Dáil using Wordscore confirms the expectation that 
significant variation in positions on policies exist within the same political parties. All 
these reasons allow discounting ideological cohesion within the parliamentary party 
groups as the source for party voting unity within the Dáil.  
A reasonable conclusion is that party leaders’ authority to allocate mega-seats 
and not the electoral system (which would predict low levels of unified party voting), 
drives Irish legislators’ roll-call behavior. Examination of the consequences in terms 
of mega-seat allocation for those Dáil Deputies who breach party discipline provides 
further observable evidence that mega-seats influence legislative roll-call behavior. 
Among the immediate consequences for a Dáil Deputy who defies the party 
leadership is loss of membership of the parliamentary party and removal from any 
mega-seat. Expulsion from the parliamentary party is effectively a suspension with 
most members returning after some months. What is generally not at stake is the loss 
of the parliamentary seat, even if the member does not regain the party label (see page 
14, point 6). The party leadership cannot afford to deselect an incumbent; the member 
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can easily gain ballot access (albeit without the party label) and gain re-election 
without the party, effectively costing the party a seat in the next general election. 
Thus, removal from the party and de-selection as a party candidate is not a credible 
threat or response to indiscipline.v  
Of Dáil Deputies who rebelled, one subsequently became Tánaiste (deputy 
Prime Minister) but only after switching parties. One more Fianna Fáil Dáil Deputy 
did secure high office despite indiscipline, although only after several years and a 
change of party leadership. Overall, the picture is clear: the cost of indiscipline is the 
removal of opportunities to hold mega-seats.  
To test more accurately the relationship between indiscipline and mega-seat 
allocation, the current research estimates the likelihood of two groups of legislators 
holding a mega-seat. The first group includes the 13 rebels previously discussed; the 
second group consists of 13 Dáil Deputies who remained loyal to the party but who 
are otherwise most similar to the rebels. Identification of the 13 loyalists used nearest-
neighbor matching (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart. 2007) which involves matching 
legislators who breached party discipline (labeled ‘rebels’) with otherwise most 
similar non-rebelling Dáil Deputies (labeled ‘loyalist’). Variables used to match 
legislators include: party, gender, years in office (at the time indiscipline occurred), 
mega-seat occupied (at the time indiscipline occurred), and electoral success (again, at 
the time indiscipline occurred). Biographical data is from the Nealon’s Guide/Irish 
Times Guide series published after each general election.  
After matching, the sample consists of 26 legislators: 13 rebels and 13 
loyalists. For this sample, the probability of winning a mega-seat is estimated using a 
logit model.vi The only explanatory variable included in the estimated model is 
Indiscipline – a dummy variable coded 1 if the legislator rebelled and 0 otherwise. 
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This variable is akin to a “treatment” variable, which identifies “treatment” as 
deliberately abstaining or voting against the party line. The use of nearest neighbor 
matching obviates the need for any additional control variables.  
The empirical expectation is that rebellion will reduce the probability of 
obtaining a mega-seat. The results reported in Table 3 corroborate this expectation: 
Legislators who rebel have a much lower chance of getting a mega-seat. The 
estimated coefficient on the variable, Indiscipline is negative and statistically 
significant. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, as reported in Table 4.  
<Table 3 around here> 
Table 4 reports the average treatment effect of Indiscipline estimated from Monte 
Carlo simulations using the logit model reported in Table 3. Holding all else equal 
(via nearest-neighbor matching), legislators who rebel are nearly 60 percent less likely 
to obtain a mega-seat than party loyalists are. On average, rebels have a 25 percent 
chance of achieving a mega seat, contrasted by loyalists who have, on average, an 82 
percent chance of obtaining a mega-seat. This high probability is consistent with the 
fact that the number of mega-seats is almost equivalent to the number of Dáil 
deputies. In sum, indiscipline dramatically reduces a legislator’s chances of obtaining 
a mega-seat (by 57 percent). The results would have been significantly stronger had 
the analysis ignored the situation of mega-seat allocation following party-switching.  
<Table 4 around here> 
Conclusion 
Existing research theorizes an important role for electoral rules in explaining the 
orientations and behavior of legislators. For example, conventional consensus argues 
that engineering of electoral systems impacts the level of party voting unity. Such 
well-established theories contrast with the difficulty of finding empirical relationships 
 23 
between electoral systems and legislator behavior in the real world. The puzzle of 
exactly what shapes the behavior of individual legislators remains.  
This study suggests exploring “Chapter 2” of electoral democracy (Carroll, 
Cox, and Pachón 2006). Unlike “Chapter 1” (election to the chamber) which occurs 
outside the legislative arena, “Chapter 2” involves the allocation of mega-seats within 
the chamber. This study suggests that the mechanisms for allocating mega-seats is a 
significant influence on the behavior of legislators. When party leaders cartelize the 
distribution of mega-seats, legislators must be responsive to the party’s leadership, all 
else equal. What members must do in order to achieve re-election may be of 
significance, but what they must do in order to win mega-seats may be of even greater 
significance. 
The example of the Irish provides a hard-test of the argument that mega-seats 
are of significance to party unity. Irish legislators face competing principals: In order 
to gain re-election, Dáil Deputies must cultivate personal votes, requiring them to be 
responsive to the interests and preferences of voters in their geographical 
constituencies. Yet, extremely high levels of unified party voting prevail within the 
chamber, suggesting evidence for this study that the politics of winning and retaining 
mega-seats retains significant value for Irish political elites. That the cost of rebelling 
against the party leadership is forgoing current and future mega-seats provides further 
evidence of the tradeoff between mega-seats’ value and indiscipline. 
The research contributes to the expanding literature that seeks to explain 
political elites’ balancing potentially competing motivations of office, policy, and re-
election (Müller and Strøm 1999). Further empirical research to uncover the 
mechanisms by which these competing motivations shape not just individual 
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behaviour but ultimately roles and functions of legislatures in monitoring government 
and producing public policy would be a valuable addition. 
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Table 1: Mega-Seats in the Irish Parliament 2007-2010 
Mega-Seat Number 
Available 
Additional Monetary 
Value (percentage of 
base salary) (a) 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 1 136 
Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) 1 116 
(Other) Cabinet Minister 13 99 
Ceann Comhairle (Presiding Officer) 1 99 
Junior Minister 15 47 
Leas-Ceann Comhairle (Deputy Presiding Officer) 1 47 
1st Opposition Party Chief Whip 1 19 
Government Chief Whip 1 18 
2nd Opposition Party Chief Whip 1 15 
Assistant Chief Whip 1 15 
Committee Chair 20 15 
Member, House of the Oireachtas Commission 3 15 
Subcommittee Chair 5 10 
1st Opposition Party Assistant Chief Whip 1 10 
Committee Vice Chair 20 8 
Committee Whip (2 per committee) 40 6 
2nd Opposition Party Assistant Chief Whip 1 6 
Smaller Party Chief Whip 2 6 
 
Notes: (a) A percentage of a Dáil Deputy’s basic salary of €100,191, which mega-seat holders continue 
to accrue in addition to the allowance for holding the mega-seat, expresses the additional monetary 
value of the mega-seat. The basis for all figures is 2009 data. Excludes allowances paid to Dáil 
Deputies from Party funds (for example, Leader of the Opposition Party). Number of available 
positions is calculated from an analysis of parliamentary proceedings and committee reports. The 
Houses of the Oireachtas provided information for the value of allowances. 
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Table 2: Breaches of Party Voting Unity, Dáil Éireann 1980-2010 
Vote Date Member Party(a) Vote Type Issue Objected to 
21-Nov-85 Mary Harney FF Voted Against Party Position Voted with Government  on Angle Irish Agreement 
14-Dec-88 Willie O'Dea FF Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government on vote on local hospital motion 
01-Jul-93 Tony Killeen FF Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government on Shannon Airport 
01-Jun-94 Derek McDowell LAB Abstained Failed to support Government position on a locally-based company (Aer Lingus) 
01-Jun-94 Joe Costello LAB Abstained Failed to support Government position on a locally-based company (Aer Lingus) 
01-Jun-94 Sean Ryan LAB Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government position on a locally-based company (Aer Lingus) 
01-Jun-94 Tommy Broughan LAB Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government position on a locally-based company (Aer Lingus) 
01-Apr-95 Paddy Harte FG Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government's Abortion Information Bill 
01-Oct-95 Michael J Noonan FF Voted Against Party Position Failed to support Government's Divorce Referendum Bill 
10-Feb-99 Beverley Flynn FF Voted Against Party Position Voted against motion criticizing behavior of ex-Minister Padriag Flynn, her father.  
28-Nov-07 Ned O'Keeffe FF Abstained Failed to support Government Motion of Confidence in Minister for Health 
13-Nov-08 James McDaid FF Abstained Failed to support Government on Opposition motion regarding cervical cancer vaccine 
01-Jul-09 Tommy Broughan LAB Abstained Failed to vote against Government anti-crime legislation 
01-Jul-10 Mattie McGrath FF Abstained(b) Failed to support Government legislation outlawing stag hunting 
01-Jul-10 Tommy Broughan LAB Abstained Failed to vote against Government legislation outlawing stag hunting 
 
Notes: (a) FF= Fianna Fáil; LAB = Labour; FG = Fine Gael.  (b) Fianna Fáil TD Mattie McGrath voted with the Opposition in an electronic vote and abstained from the walk-
through vote. The analysis conforms to Gallagher’s (2010) data which covers the period 1993-2010. Here, we focus on voting behavior only rather than other forms of 
indiscipline. 
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Table 3: Logit Model of Winning a Mega-seat with Nearest-neighbor Matching 
 
 
  
Treatment  -2.909*** 
 (1.01) 
Constant 1.705** 
 (0.77) 
Observations 26 
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 Table 4: Average Treatment Effect of Indiscipline With Nearest-neighbor Matching 
 
 
 Probability of Obtaining a Mega-Seat 
Rebel 0.25 
(0.11)*** 
Loyalist  0.82 
(0.11)*** 
Average treatment effect of rebellion  -0.57 
(0.16)*** 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01.  
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Figure 1: Complementary or Competing Impact of the Electoral System and Mega-seat 
Allocation System on Incentives for Unified Party Voting 
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i
. In considering mega-seats (Carroll, Cox, and Pachón 2006) are concerned with the 
degree of proportionality in the allocation of mega-seats between political parties. 
ii
. In equilibrium, the reasons for different allocation rules for seats (the electoral 
system) and mega-seats (seats within the legislature) occurring remains unclear. In the 
case Ireland, the dominant party in 1959 and again in 1968 attempted, without 
success, to change the electoral system to a single member plurality system. 
iii
. Non-Party Dáil Deputies generally do not receive mega-seat assignments. 
Exceptions occur when minority governments rely on independent members for 
support. In such situations, the government has allocated Committee Chairs to select 
independent Deputies.  
iv
. To check the robustness of this approach, traditional roll-call analysis was 
undertaken for a randomly selected year (1996). As roll-call data is not available in 
machine-readable form, for each of the 93 divisions that year, each “Yes” or “No” 
vote was reconciled with membership in each legislative party. As expected from the 
media analysis for 2006, no cases of party indiscipline emerged for that year, 
confirming the reliability of using media reports to identify indiscipline in the Irish 
case. 
v
. Shomer (2009) discussed the impact of candidate selection rules on behavior in the 
Israel Knesset. Much of the personal vote literature fails to differentiate between the 
selectorate and the electorate.  
vi
. Due to use of the matching technique, the logit model includes no control variables. 
